Immediately after 1997 the Asian economies were viewed to be catastrophes of financial excess, corporate and political misgovernance, and diminishing returns to over-investment. But they are now freshly restored as the world's economic powerhouses, just as before the 1997 financial crises they were the growth miracles and poster children of a then-emerging consensus on managed economic development. From the perspective of global growth and income distribution, the economic successes of East and Southeast Asia are striking: Poverty alleviation in China alone has recently accounted for 100% of that for all of humanity. Even if still relatively small in size, the current contribution to world economic growth from East and Southeast Asia already matches that of economies many times larger. When the rest of the world economy has temporarily slowed, East and Southeast Asia have provided a stabilizing force in world business cycles. How have underlying fundamentals for economic growth changed since 1997? Is the current growth path sustainable; and if so, what has brought that about? What role has China's played in driving economic growth throughout East and Southeast Asia? Have patterns of trade changed towards greater global balance? This paper finds that in the main productivity growth has improved since 1997. Increasing inequality is no obstacle to poverty reduction provided economic growth is sufficiently rapid. Finally, international trade patterns have shifted towards greater exchange within just the region itself.
However, because PPP calculations seek to evaluate better the welfare that accrues to a population, they are more appropriate when reporting, say, the condition of the world's poor. Between 1981 and 2005 the number of people in the world living on less than PPP$1.25 a day fell from 1904 million to 1400 million, a reduction in world poverty of 504 million people (CHEN, S. and Ravallion, M., 2008 Table 8b ). Over this time, the East Asia and Pacific region saw its population in that low-income bracket decline from 1088 million to 337 million: This is a reduction of 751 million, and thus 50% larger than the world's decline overall. In fact, in China alone, the number of people living on less than PPP$1.25 a day fell from 835 million to 208 million, a fall of 627 million, already itself greater than the entire world's poverty reduction.
Both in its contribution to world growth and in reducing global poverty, the economic development of ESE Asia has emerged over the last half century as perhaps the single largest significant force in the world.
Three large events have played significant roles in this macroeconomic history, and in different directions. First, Japan-in 2006 still ESE Asia's largest economy, at market exchange rates more than double the size of China-has seen growth slow dramatically to an annual rate of just 1.3% since 1990, from an annual average of 10% in the 1960s, and 4% in each of the 1970s and 1980s.
Second, China has, a matter of simple arithmetic, powered a lot of the growth in ESE Asia: From a GDP level only 5% of the total ESE Asia's on average through the 1960s, China grew to make up 23% of total ESE Asia GDP by 2006, just as Japan's share in ESE Asia shrank from an average of over 80% in the 1960s to 55% by 2006. At the same time China experienced spectacular economic growth and dramatically reduced the number of its people living in extreme poverty, inequality within China also sharply increased (e.g., Quah 2003) .
Third, the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis saw a sharp simultaneous fall in the value of many ESE Asian currencies: from June 1997 to mid-January 1998 exchange rates against the US dollar of the currencies of Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand fell by over 50%, that of Singapore, 20% (ITO, T., 2007 Figure 3 ). In Japan and in every single one of these Asian Currency Crisis economies, GDP growth turned negative in 1998, with the combined fall in these economies' 1998 GDP amounting to 2.4% of GDP in ESE Asia the preceding year. This paper assesses the factors surrounding ESE Asia's remarkable recent economic performance, paying attention to these three large events. It concludes that in the main productivity growth has improved since 1997; and that trading patterns have shifted more towards trade across just different parts of ESE Asia itself. Provided economic growth is sufficiently rapid, increased inequality does not hinder reduction in poverty. The balance in ESE Asia has been that economic growth has been sufficiently high, and poverty reduction has taken place. In ESE Asia, it is growth rather than the reduction of inequality that has most successfully brought the poor out of extreme poverty.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents again facts on the patterns of economic growth in ESE Asia, this time in greater detail. It highlights the importance of both China and the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis for shaping recent growth in the region.
Section 3 considers sources of growth in ESE Asia: it studies the evolution of productivity in different parts of ESE Asia, and points to where the situation has changed and where it has not since the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis. The data here vary across sources but, in this paper's reading, show productivity growth in ESE Asia neither significantly worse nor better than that elsewhere in the world. Some of the data indicate improvement in ESE Asian productivity growth since 1997.
Section 4 analyzes patterns of trade across ESE Asia. It shows the importance of integration within the region itself. China's trade with the rest of ESE Asia has consistently been double that with either the EU or the US. Similarly, Japan and South Korea's trade with ESE Asia (including China) have by the mid 2000s similarly grown to be double that with either the EU or the US. Although Japan and South Korea used to have one-third of their trade with the US, since the mid 2000s or earlier, it has been with China that each of them has had much the larger and rising trade share.
Section 5 concludes.
(The Appendix, Section 6, provides details on the data used in this paper.)
THE BASIC FACTS AGAIN, IN GREATER DETAIL
This section provides more detail and context for the description of ESE Asian growth given in the Introduction.
To begin, this section draws together and quantifies the significance of three key observations: the large economy that is Japan; the fast growth in China; the relative economic slowdown in ESE Asia following the1997 Asian Currency Crisis. All three of these are examined in the following.
ESE ASIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AFTER 1997
If Japan is excluded from ESE Asia, the income growth path for the entire region is practically unchanged before and after 1997 ( 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 ESE Asia\Japan GDP Fitted, through 1996
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To assess the quantitative significance of this observation, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide the same calculations for world GDP and ESE Asia (now including Japan) in turn. In both these cases the under-performance relative to trend is marked: For world GDP the accumulated under-performance relative to 1997-2006 extrapolated trend amounts to 11%; that for ESE Asia, 27%. By contrast the under-performance for ESE Asia (excluding Japan) is only 5%. 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 The post-1997 trend performance of ESE Asia excluding Japan, compared to that for the world economy, is noteworthy for how it contradicts a widely-held view on the permanent and significant effects of the1997 Asian Currency Crisis. Indeed, by historical standards the region appears to have performed better than the world economy overall. 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000 2005 ESE Asia\Japan+China GDP Fitted, through 1996 This relative slowdown in growth relative to historical trend has not reduced the increasing weight of ESE Asia's GDP in the world economy. Figure 2 .5 shows that Page 8 except for Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia, every single economy in ESE Asia has increased its share of world growth after 1997, compared to before. Across all of ESE Asia, taking out Japan, the share of world growth doubled to 20% after 1997 from only 10% before. Figure 2.5 holds three key messages. First, Japan and China necessarily dominate any discussion of the performance of ESE Asia, with South Korea a relatively distant third. Second is that already stated: the great majority of economies in ESE Asia contributed more to world growth after 1997 than before. Third, the Figure gives a dramatic illustration of group (conditional) convergence in the sense described by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) , Baumol (1986), and Quah (1997) . Those economies originally richer grow more slowly; those originally poorer, faster. With Japan and China by 2006 over one-half and nearly one-quarter of all ESE Asia respectively, the dynamics in Figure 2 .5 show growth patterns that imply a force for equality in the region.
As earlier stated, one of the virtues of measurement at current market exchange rates is that the results directly assess contribution to a global exchange of goods and services. To that end, Table 2 .1 shows how growth in ESE Asia in general and China in particular have begun to match in magnitude that of the US economy. By 2002-2006 ESE Asia grew by 12% more than the US did, the ratio having steadily risen over the preceding decade. In that period China alone, although having per capita GDP only 4% of that in the US, contributed 54% as much as did the latter to world economic growth. The world economy was also stabilized through periods of US slowdown by ESE Asia and China: In 2001 when US growth dipped, ESE Asia and China grew by 78% and 34% more than US. In 1991 when US growth turned negative, ESE Asia and China grew by 18 and 3 times, respectively, more than the US growth slowdown.
POVERTY
The contribution of ESE Asia and China in the world economy occurred, however, not just through adding to world GDP growth but also through reducing the absolute numbers of poor in the world. For 1981 China appears in the extreme upper left in Figure 2 .6: it is poor on average and holds many extremely poor people. Over time, the China bubble sinks and moves rightwards. Economic growth occurs and lifts hundreds of millions of Chinese out of extreme poverty. By 2005 China both holds fewer extremely poor people and is per capita richer than India and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Figures 2.6-2.9 also show that the rest of East Asia and the Pacific region have in parallel with China also grown and successfully reduced poverty, although nowhere to the same magnitude as China alone. The impact of China on world poverty is not due only to its having such a large population. 
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Second, while successful overall, China's poverty reduction has not been uniform throughout this time. Between 1987 and 1990 when economic growth slowed, poverty in China increased markedly as well.
Third, both from the 1987-1990 episode and by comparison to India, China's growth and size alone do not make automatic large-scale poverty reduction. Growth has to be sufficiently rapid to overturn the negative effects arising from increases in population and in inequality.
SOURCES OF GROWTH
Thus, even as ESE Asia has risen to contribute significantly to world economic growth, it has significantly reduced world poverty and stabilized the world economy against downturns. Japan continues to be the largest economy in ESE Asia but its growth slowdown is more than matched by the increase from China.
How has this state of affairs come about? And what are prospects for its continuing? This second question is particularly compelling in light of observations by Krugman (1994) and Young (1995) on the factor input-driven nature of Asia's economic growth, suggesting that Asia's growth has occurred not through increases in productivity especially but instead through unsustainable "mere sweat"-nothing more than hard work and savings.
This section draws on comprehensive cross-country productivity estimates recently constructed in Jorgensen and Vu (2005) (subsequently updated and kindly provided this author by Khuong Vu). These estimates extend past-1997 and therefore allow evaluating the impact of policies put in place or changes arising from the Asian Currency Crisis.
From differences in data sources and detail the estimates in Jorgensen and Vu (2005) do not match exactly, say, Young's (1995 Young's ( , 2003 estimates for the pre-1995 sample ( 3.1 GROWTH DECOMPOSITIONS Figure 3 .1 shows growth decompositions, before and after 1997, of three different large blocs: the G7, India, and China. The focus is China; the G7 and India provide comparison examples. Before 1997 growth in China was driven heavily (over 23%) by labour hours, certainly at a pace much greater than the G7 but also than India. After 2000, however, the principal factor-input driver for growth in China shifted to physical capital, from 27% earlier up to 44%. Throughout this time TFP growth was maintained. Compared to China's shift, changes in the G7 and India have been less readily observable. Figure 3 .2 shows similar decompositions, again before and after 1997, but now comparing the three largest economies in ESE Asia, i.e., China, South Korea, and Japan. China's shift from labour hours to physical capital, already noted, is notable even in comparison with these other large Asian economies. The difference from Japan is most stark: in the latter physical capital's contribution more than halved from 94% to 40%, with the slack taken up entirely in TFP. South Korea's position, in contrast to both China and Japan, is remarkably invariant: before 1997 physical capital contributed 50% of growth, labour 26%, and TFP 24%; after 1997, physical capital 47%, labour 30%, and TFP 23%. If growth in South Korea had been overly intensive in physical capital before 1997, little seems to have changed.
Finally, Figure 3 .3 shows growth decompositions, before and after 1997, for Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, whose growth performance in connection with productivity has been studied intensively (Hsieh 2002 , Young 1995 . Here, the interest is in how that performance has varied before and after the Asian currency crisis. The most striking feature in, Figure 3 .3 is the stability of TFP's contribution to growth in both Hong Kong and Singapore but its dramatic fall-away in Taiwan, where physical capital investment has surged after 1997. Singapore has reduced its Page 17 reliance on labour hours and increased the growth contribution from physical capital: the two changes together kept invariant TFP's contribution to overall growth. 
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TRADE
The analyses in previous sections of this paper have considered the growth performance of ESE Asian economies either individually or together as a bloc. However, to consider changing trade dynamics or to examine the role of China's growth on other economies in the region, we need to study bilateral or multilateral patterns of national engagement, where these interacting economies are explicitly identified.
5 Figure 4 .1 shows the evolving patterns of trade between the rest of ESE Asia and, in turn, China, Japan, and South Korea-the three largest economies in ESE Asia. 
CONCLUSION
This paper has provided a large-scale, global perspective on growth in East and Southeast Asia since the 1990s. It has traced, in particular, the importance of the rise of China and changes in the region since 1997, when the Asian Currency Crisis appeared to diminish economic prospects following decades of rapid economic growth.
Many of the important conclusions have already figured in the Introduction. But they are numerically memorable and so might be useful to repeat here. Even with 1997 having dramatically perturbed growth in ESE Asia, the region has more than doubled its share of world GDP at market exchange rates. Much of that has been due to China alone.
Over periods of short sharp slowdowns in the rest of the world, ESE Asia has continued to grow in sufficient absolute volume of goods and services, and thus has stabilised the world against yet sharper downturns. China by itself has brought over 600 million people out of extreme poverty in the last quarter century, accounting for pretty much the entire reduction in extreme poverty in the world.
Productivity growth in the region overall varies, but in the main is neither consistently better nor worse than that elsewhere: In one reading productivity growth has improved since 1997. The data here, however, vary considerably across different sources.
In trade, ESE Asia has become ever more tightly integrated. Both Japan and South Korea used to have one-third of their international trade with the US alone. However, since the mid 2000s, their trade with China has consistently exceeded that with both the US and the EU. In all three of these-ESE Asia's largest economies -trade with the rest of ESE Asia has become by far the largest meaningful share of their trade with the rest of the world.
APPENDIX
This Appendix details sources and construction for the data used in this paper.
As explained in footnote 1 East Asia in this paper means China, Hong Kong China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, while Southeast Asia denotes Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The term G7 refers to the collection comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US.
In 1960 East and Southeast Asia (or ESE Asia), with 33% of the world's population, generated at market exchange rates 12% of world GDP. That year the region's per capita income was 35% of the world average. By 2006 per capita income in ESE Asia had risen to 79% of world average. Holding then 31% of the world's population, ESE Asia produced at market exchange rates over 24% of world GDP. In 2006 world GDP, measured in constant year 2000 US dollars, was $37.9 trillion, while the world's population comprised 6.54 billion people. 
